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I. INTRODUCTION

Defamation on the Internet is a serious problem with real world
consequences for victims. The effects of online defamation are growing
more severe as Google and other search engines become more effective at
retrieving information about people. The problem is amplified because
federal law immunizes Internet companies and website owners from
liability for the defamatory content others post on their websites even
when it is brought to their attention. Many academics have proposed
solutions with little practical success. The failure of academic
commentators to propose solutions that are actually implemented results
from their unrealistic expectation that Congress generally cares what law
professors and law students have to say.
In the absence of a solution that restores liability to Internet
intermediaries, plaintiffs are taking direct action using the only tool left
available to them: John Doe lawsuits. In these suits the defamation
plaintiffs seek to expose the party who posted the content as a way to
silence and deter the poster. Rather than suing the websites to take down
the material, plaintiffs instead subpoena the websites to obtain the real
identity of the online critic.
This Article recognizes both the problem of online defamation and the
potential dangers of public figures and corporations using subpoenas to
expose and silence online critics. A court being asked to compel disclosure
should first determine the status of the plaintiff before issuing a subpoena.
This Article advocates the adoption of a standard that makes it easier to
issue subpoenas against Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to reveal the
identity of anonymous posters when the plaintiff is a private figure while
retaining and developing more difficult standards when the plaintiff is a
public figure. This modest solution requires common law judges, rather
than Congress, be forced to take action to confront the problem.
Part IIexplains the problem of online defamation, why defamation law
itself is not being used to force Internet companies to take down harmful
material, and why plaintiffs have resorted to using civil procedure in the
form of subpoenas to Internet companies that expose the poster as a way
to stop the defamation. Part UI explains the use of subpoenas in John Doe
lawsuits and argues that, because constitutional considerations have
shaped substantive defamation law, they should also influence the
procedural law for issuing subpoenas in anonymous defamation cases.
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II. ONLINE LIABILITY

A. The Defamation Problem
By the year 2006, thirty-five percent of all Internet users and forty-two
percent of home broadband users had posted some Internet content.' At
least some of this content was defamatory. To be actionable, such content
must be a false and defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff,
involve an unprivileged publication to a third party, and have been posted
with fault amounting to at least negligence. 2 "The legitimate state interest
underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm
inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood."3
Defamatory content can do much more than just annoy the victim. It
can destroy reputations, damage job prospects, inflict serious emotional
harm, and haunt victims for longer than may be intended. People have
been defaming each other on the Internet for years, but the consequences
are arguably increasing4 and "can cause embarrassment or, at worst,
economic harm."5 Online defamation could also manipulate stock prices
and harm businesses.6 The proliferation and damage done by online
defamation was a foreseeable product of having no accountability.7
"Where there is no accountability there is often no responsibility."'
Essentially, the Communications Decency Act (CDA) "leaves no one

1. Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility?:Lessonsfrom
the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 238 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Morgamoth v. Whithall, 411 N.W.2d. 859, 861 (1987).
3. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
4. The pre-law and law school gossip forum Autoadmit.com has received a lot of news
coverage, particularly the story of female law students at Yale Law School. Anonymous message
board users discussed and criticized these students in a very vulgar manner spawning litigation and
a great deal of media coverage. See Caitlin Hall, Swimming Downstream: Battling Defamatory
Online Content via Acquiescence, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287 (2007) (law student victim of
Autoadmit defamation); Brittan Heller, Of Legal Rights and Moral Wrongs: A Case Study of
Internet Defamation, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 279 (2007) (victim of Autoadmit defamation).
5. Jeffrey Elkin, Cybersmears:Dealing With Defamation on the Net, 9 JAN-FEB BUs. L.
TODAY 22, 22 (2000).
6. Id. at 25-26 (discussing fears about stock prices being manipulated by anonymous

defamation).
7. SeegenerallyAndrew Slitt, Note, TheAnonymous Publisher:Defamationon theInternet
After Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union andZeran v. America Online, 31 CONN. L. REv. 389,
411, 415 (1998) ("the differences between the newspaper and the Internet ... will lead to
unremediable anonymous defamation in cyberspace" and "[a]nonymous communication will
undoubtedly fuel defamation in cyberspace").
8. Id. at415.
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legally accountable for injuries caused by anonymous postings on the
Internet."9 The ISPs and website owners are the ones with the greatest
ability to take down the defamatory material, and the CDA prevents them
from being compelled to do so. 10 The legislative history of the CDA shows
that Congress had something different in mind than providing immunity
for Internet companies and website hosts who do nothing when their users
post defamatory content.'
The underlying provisions of the CDA do not necessarily require the
extension of immunity, but some see such action as a misinterpretation by
the courts. 2 The Zeran court held that § 230 of the CDA was intended by
Congress to prevent Internet providers from being liable for online
defamation as a "policy choice" to protect speech.13 The Zeran court did
not distinguish between traditional publisher and distributor liability
because, upon receiving notice, the ISP "is cast in the same position as the
party who originally posted the offensive messages."' 4 The Zeran court
held that treating the CDA as only covering publisher liability rather than
9. David A. Myers, Defamation and the QuiescentAnarchy of the Internet: A Case Study
ofCyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 667,668 (2006). Courts will probably further apply CDA
immunity to bloggers, even if that too was beyond the scope of congressional intent. Melissa A.
Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why TraditionalDefamation Laws Should Apply to
Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1447, 1460-63, 1465 (2006).
10. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
11. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 1, at 249-51; Christopher Butler, Note, Plotting the
Return of an Ancient Tort to Cyberspace: Towards a New FederalStandardofResponsibilityfor
DefamationforInternetService Providers,6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247,251-52,255
(2000); Ternisha Miles, Casenotes, Barrett v. Rosenthal: Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave-No
Liabilityfor Web Defamation, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 267, 278 (2007) ("broad interpretation of the
CDA may not be consistent with legislative purpose and Congress may not have intended to
completely immunize private individuals from liability"); Joshua M. Masur, A Most Uncommon
Carrier:Online ServiceProviderImmunity Against Defamation Claims in Blumenthal v. Drudge,
40 JuRIMETRics J. 217, 227 (2000) (suggesting that nonderogation cannon be applied by the courts
to prevent the CDA from wreaking unintended fundamental changes); David R. Sheridan, Zeran
v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for
Defamationon the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REv. 147, 167-69 (1997).
12. The text of CDA reads: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008). Some suggest that this only covers only publisher liability,
not distributor liability. See, e.g., James P. Jena, When is a UserNot a "User"?Findingthe Proper
Role for Republication Liability on the Internet, 24 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 453, 482 (2004)
("Poster-users who maliciously republish libelous content over the Internet will not be able to use
the CDA to shield them from liability."); Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort
Liabilityfor Online Third-party Content UnderSection 230 of the CommunicationsAct, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 647 (2000)(discussing different judicial interpretations).
13. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31.
14. Id. at 333. See discussion of distributor liability, infra text accompanying note 15.
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distributor liability would undermine congressional intent and chill
speech."5

Whether Congress immunized ISPs from distributor liability, or the
courts immunized ISPs in a mistaken interpretation of Congressional will,
the status quo is that the parties most equipped to do something about
online defamation are not legally required to do anything. 6 Meanwhile,
anonymous posters are insulting and tearing at people's lives. While online
gossip is normally just embarrassing, sometimes "boorish banter gives way
to injurious falsehood."' 7 Because companies routinely "Google" potential
hires," defamatory content can hurt an individual's job prospects since
"[c]ompanies such as law firms that rely heavily on their reputations have
enormous incentives to tightly regulate them."' 9 The real-world
consequences for businesses suffering from defamation of themselves,
their products, or their employees can be substantial, even including a
nationwide boycott of a company after false and derogatory rumors spread
on the Internet.2 ° Providing immunity for the providers and web hosts
makes it difficult for companies and defamed individuals to stop
destructive rumors and innuendo. This immunity remains in place as
"Internet training wheels" 21 that subsidizes both web providers and web
defamers, leading to large amounts of nasty, defamatory speech on the

15. Id. at 333-34.
16. Id. at 330-34. Courts have not directly addressed every issue of § 230 liability, such as
reader blogs on newspaper websites, but "a number of courts have left open the possibility that
active solicitation of content could eliminate Section 230 immunity .... Adam J. Rappaport &
Amanda M. Leith, Brave New World? Legal Issues Raised by Citizen Journalism?,25 Summer
CoMM. LAW. 1, 30 (2007).
17. Thomas G. Ciarlone Jr. & Eric W. Wiechmann, Cybersmear May Be Coming to a
Website Near You: A Primerfor CorporateVictims, 70 DEF. COUNs. J.51, 51 (2003) (discussing
corporate strategies to go after anonymous online defamers).
18. Susan W. Brenner, Prosecution Responses to Internet Victimization: Should Online
Defamation Be Criminalized?,76 MiSS. L.J. 705, 787 (2007).
19. Hall, supra note 4, at 288; see also S. Elizabeth Malloy, Bloggership: How Blogs are
TransformingLegal Scholarship:Anonymous Bloggers andDefamation:BalancingInterests on
the Internet, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1187, 1191 (2006) ("For instance, employers who do background
checks on possible future employees may discover blog information that is false. If employment
decisions are based even in part on these bloggers' comments, victims suffer both emotional and
economic losses."); Tugba Colpan & L.R. Skibell, ManagingRisk to Reputation: The Challenge
of the InternetforLegal Recruiting, 2005 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3, *2 (2005) (noting the need for
law firms "to develop a comprehensive strategy for protecting themselves from embarrassing
rumors or incidents that may impact the perception of quality of life at the firm.").
20. Ciarlone & Wiechmann, supra note 17, at 51 (discussing nationwide boycott of Mrs.
Fields cookies after a myth surfaced that they were donating cookies to an O.J. Simpson victory
party).
21. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 1, at 238.
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Internet. This "[u]nbridled innuendo has broader, systematically corrosive
consequences to society."22 These consequences are getting worse in the
Google era.
In the past, one could defame a party on electronic bulletin boards,
message boards, and e-mail, but the effect of that defamation was often
limited to those who either directly received the defamatory material or
sought out those message boards. The improved efficiency of Internet
search engines such as Google, with its ability to index and search even the
most obscure message boards and forums, and the more routine practice
of Googling people when hiring or dating, means that even "bathroom
graffiti" posted on an unimportant Internet message board can come up
when the name mentioned is queried. Thus a Googled-person's reputation
can be broadly destroyed by comments that would have previously reached
a very narrow audience. Even with this happening, not everyone feels that
the status quo is a problem.
B. Supportfor the Status Quo and a Self-Help Regime
Some commentators believe that a party defamed online can
sufficiently remedy the harm by "posting a comment countering the
defamatory speech."23 Since any regime that makes it easier to go after
defamers using an institution of government could be viewed as a form of
censorship, one can understand why people would try to protect the status
quo from government intervention if at all possible. Self-help remedies
and "counterspeech" constitute an online form of self-governance, 24 thus
leaving the Internet free of government censorship. Sharing some of the
same concerns, courts may show enthusiasm for self-help remedies
because they avoid chilling online speech.25 Self-help, counterspeech, and
judicial deference to Internet self-government norms all mean that the
government does nothing when online defamation injures a party.
Even one of the victims of the Autoadmit defamation advised that
"[w]hat we can do, and should do, is nothing," because as online
defamation and noise proliferates it will cease to stand out.26 The more
noise floating around on the Internet, the less value it will have. Once
posters destroy everybody's reputation online, employers and clients will
not pay attention to online comments. But not everyone will be defamed
22. Ciarlone & Wiechmann, supra note 17, at 52.
23. Jennifer M. Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger: Legal Protections,Self-Regulation and
Other Failures,2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 343, 366 (2006).
24. Id. at 366-67.
25. Id. at 375.
26. Hall, supra note 4, at 289.
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equally. Attractive women, religious minorities, students active in
politics-it is easy to imagine people more likely to be defamed online
than the general population. If an employer Googles two candidates and
finds detailed comment threads disparaging one candidate (and knows
clients would find the same things) and nothing on the other, the defamed
candidate may find his or her job prospects hurt.27
Even if two people are defamed in the exact same way, they may suffer
different consequences. One may be more thick-skinned than the other
who may suffer severe emotional distress over something that a crass
person might be more inclined to laugh over.:" But vulgar forums like
Autoadmit might one day destroy all value of a reputation, and perhaps
society's views on morality will change such that sexual innuendo will be
meaningless. The online predators will just change their choice of words.
Today sexual innuendo works to injure a reputation, tomorrow it might be
a statement that an attorney steals client funds or refuses to serve black
clients. 29 These accusations could end the victim's career.

27. It is also worth noting that certain names are more "Googleable" than others. The more
unique the name, or more uniquely spelled, the more likely a search for it will bring up results
about the specific person such as Caitlin Hall. See Hall, supra note 4. Whereas a very generic name,
like Jason Miller, brings up too many responses about too many Jason Miller's for the results to
appear meaningful.
28. For a libel claim the plaintiff must show an injury to reputation and the damages flow
from that injury. Carter v. Hubbard, 480 S.E.2d 382, 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("gravamen of civil
libel is injury to reputation") (quoting Sigmon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254, 257 (1981)). In a false
light or invasion of privacy claim, emotional distress as a damage can flow from the exposure itself
rather than as a product of an injury to reputation. See RESTATEMENT 2D OF TORTS, § 652E,
Illustration 3 (even where conduct not necessarily sufficient to damage reputation, plaintiff can
recover for invasion of privacy); see also RESTATEMENT 2D OF TORTS, § 652H (allowing recovery
for the harm to plaintiff's "interest in privacy resulting from the invasion" including mental distress
suffered as a result of that invasion); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 n.9 (1967) ("'[Tlhe
primary harm being compensated [in defamation] is damage to reputation. In the 'right of privacy'
cases the primary damage is the mental distress from having been exposed to public view, although
injury to reputation may be an element bearing upon such damage."').
29. The four traditional categories of slander per se were accusations of unchastity, being
afflicted with a loathsome disease, commission of a serious crime, and comments affecting your
trade. See, e.g., Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 977 (N.J. 1994); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75,
79 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993). If
chastity-related remarks will not cut deep enough in the future, business or criminal comments
probably will. The evolution of social mores influences defamation law, as seen by the fact that
falsely calling a plaintiff a homosexual is not slander per se in many states. See, e.g., Hayes v.
Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Boehm v. Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc., 557
So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 111. App. 3d 481,361 N.E.2d 74,
76, 5 Ill. Dec. 74 (111. Ct. App. 1977); Key v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 242,
598 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990).
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An online defamation victim always has an alternative to doing
nothing. He or she can fight back directly by posting a response. However,
standing up against a defamer and using online self-help may generate
even more defamatory comments and hostile reactions from others on the
website or message board.3° Companies are warned "that the harder one
fights against decentralized networks like Napster, Osama bin Laden's Al
Qaeada network and anonymous posters of cybersmear, the more enemies
one creates."3' The victim can suffer more damage for standing up for
himself. Furthermore, self-help by replying to a statement may not be
effective "because those who read the first statement may not necessarily
re-visit the same [w]eb site to read the response, and the defamed party
may already have sustained substantial injury before he could post a
'
correction."32
This problem is exacerbated because Google indexes content in a nonchronological fashion such that "the offending material might still come
up first in Google" even if it was successfully rebutted on the defamatory
site itself or elsewhere on the web.33 A rebuttal might not be read, might
not come up in a Google search first, might not come up at all, might not
be read because of its placement below other posts, and might inflame
further defamation of the victim. Consequently, more speech is not an
effective solution to online defamation in the Google era.34 Many websites
will voluntarily cooperate by removing defamatory material when the
victim brings it to their attention and will reveal a user's identity when the
victim threatens a lawsuit.35 But here again self-help has not been a
sufficient deterrent to stop defamatory posts. 36 Accordingly, academics

30. Heller, supra note 4, at 279.
31. Stephen R. Buckingham & Alix R. Rubin, Anonymous Posters ComplicateDiscovery,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, § 4 (col 3) (2001).
32. Stephanie Blumstein, Note, The New Immunity in Cyberspace: The ExpandedReach of
the Communications Decency Act to the Libelous "Re-poster,"9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 407, 424
(2003).
33. Heller, supra note 4, at 281.
34. Id.
35. "Despite section 230, however, as a matter of policy most Web hosts and ISPs will block
any defamatory or abusive material of which they are made aware. Furthermore, Web hosts and
ISPs will often divulge an anonymous user's identity to companies who threaten legal action."
Ronald F. Lopez, CorporateStrategiesfor Addressing Internet "Complaint" Sites, 14 INT'L L.
PRACTICUM 101, 105 (2001) (further noting that Yahoo! has a disclaimer for its Business & Finance
message boards warning that it will reveal LP addresses of users when faced with legal process).
See also Elkin, supra note 5, at 26 (stating that before legal action companies can try to counter the
information and ask that it be removed).
36. For instance, self-help did nto deter the defamatory posts on Audoadmit.com. See
discussion of Autoadmit.com, supra text accompanying note 4.
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have proposed solutions that would restore traditional liability to the
Internet intermediaries as a way to reduce online defamation.
C. ProposedSolutions and Restoring Third Party Liability
Allowing an Internet company to be punished for content it did not
create may sound far-fetched and radical to a young web user but, absent
the immunity provisions of the CDA, this would be the law. Basically,
courts could treat Internet defamation like graffiti-if you own the wall
and fail to remove the graffiti in a timely manner, you will face liability for
what it says." 7 The CDA's immunity provisions prevent state courts from

approaching online graffiti in the same manner as offline graffiti. At
common law there were distinctions among types of third party liability.
Publishers are held to higher standards and are liable for all of the
content they publish, while distributors are only liable for defamation if
they know or have reason to know of the defamatory content.38 If someone
informs a website's owner, who is accountable as a distributor, that their
site is distributing defamatory content, the owner would be held liable if
he or she failed to remove the content. Applying distributor liability to
website hosts and Internet companies for online defamation gives them an
incentive to police their own sites and deters negligence and
complacency. 39 Of course it is possible to go too far. Strict liability for
allowing defamatory postings would "produce overdeterrence when
applied to liable third parties such as ISPs."4' Legal scholars do not
advocate strict liability for distributing or publishing online defamation,
but they offer a variety of fixes to alter the current liability scheme and
reduce online defamation.

37. Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox Libel, Slander & the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 279, 287 (1999); "One who intentionally and unreasonably fails to
remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or
under his control is subject to liability for its continued publication." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577 (1977). See, e.g., Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942)
(explaining that bar owner is liable for not taking down graffiti in men's bathroom); Tidmore v.
Mills, 32 So. 2d 769 (Ala. Ct. App. 1947) (sign on barn); Cynthia L. Counts & Amanda Martin,
Libel in Cybersspace:A FrameworkforAddressingLiability andJurisdictionalIssues in this New
Frontier,59 ALB. L. REv. 1083, 1099-1102 (1996) (discussing graffiti principle).
38. Butler, supra note 11, at 258.
39. It might give them too much incentive. It might be cheaper and easier for a website
operator to remove postings every time somebody complains that it is defamatory than to
investigate the merits of the complaint. It could also decrease the number of interactive websites.
This could have a very strong chilling effect for online speech, which the Zeran Court realized.
40. AssafHamdani, Who's Liablefor Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELLL. REv. 901,904 (2002).
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Some offer multiple solutions like "traditional liability for damages,
takedown schemes in which the intermediary must remove offensive
content upon proper notice, and 'hot list' schemes in which the
intermediary must avoid facilitation of transactions with certain parties."'
Other solutions involve requiring ISPs, websites, and other intermediaries
to keep accurate records of their individual users to make punishing the
actual guilty party easier and, if the intermediaries fail to keep such
records, shift liability to them for any defamation caused by those using
their services.42 Another solution suggests that Congress should amend the
CDA to provide liability when the provider actively selects third-party
statements (like bloggers approving and moderating comments) for
publication and distinguish between publishers and distributors.43 To
preserve the accuracy and value of information on the Internet, one scholar
even advocates inserting "a narrowly-focused, precisely-defined
defamation offense into our criminal law." The most popular solution in
the legal literature, though, does not criminalize online defamation but
instead borrows the notice and take-down concept that is found in other
laws regulating the Internet.45
D. Adapting The DMCA 's Notice and Take-Down ProvisionsTo
Online Defamation
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) shields ISPs from
liability for distributing copyrighted material over their networks if they
take down the infringing material after being notified by the copyright
holder. While it is debatable how successful the DMCA has been, it is
clear that the DMCA does something to thwart copyright infringement,
whereas the CDA seems to promote online defamation. Applying notice
and take-down principles to defamation would basically restore distributor
liability to the online intermediaries that would exist absent the CDA.
Using a DMCA-style liability scheme has been praised by academics as

41. Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise ofInternet IntermediaryLiability, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 240 (2005).
42. See generally Pincus, supra note 37 (discussing the liability of intermediaries for failing
to keep actual records).
43. Troiano, supra note 9, at 1475-76.
44. Brenner, supranote 18, at 786; Rappaport & Leith, supra note 16, at 34. But see Salil K.
Mehra, Posta Message andgo to Jail: CriminalizingInternetLibel in Japanandthe UnitedStates,
78 U. CoLO. L. REV. 767, 816 (2007) (describing criminalizing online defamation as "a cure far
worse than the disease").
45. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49.
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the most logical,' most efficient,47 most cost effective4 8 way to address
online defamation.49 For instance, a Proposed Online Defamation Limited
Liability Act would include a safe harbor provision similar to DMCA
(notice and take-down), limited liability for Internet intermediaries through
a statutory cap on damages, and a public Internet intermediary defense
fund as insurance against unwarranted liability.5"
Attaching liability to the intermediaries gives them an incentive to
remove defamatory content and, to save their own time and costs, to take
steps likely to reduce future defamation. Imposing liability only after
notice helps to keep costs down on the Internet companies and prevents the
imposition of liability without fault. The after-the-fact nature of notice and
take-down will not chill speech as much as a prior restraint or criminal
sanction for online defamation. The only punishment comes after a
company is told of the problem and refuses to do anything reasonable
about it.
There are reasons that DMCA-style notice and take-down might not
work with online defamation. In response to a complaint, risk-adverse ISPs
might remove legitimate material. It is easier to establish who holds a
copyright than whether a statement is defamatory; liability could end up
chilling speech and eliminating many forums.5 ' "The fact is that anything
46. Robert T. Langdon, Note, The Communications Decency Act § 230: Make Sense? Or
Nonsense?-A PrivatePerson'sInability to Recover ifDefamed in Cyberspace,73. ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 829, 855 (1999).
47. Mann & Belzley, supra note 41, at 276-77.
48. David E. Hallett, How to Destroy a Reputation and Get Away With It: The
Communications Decency Act Examined: Do the Policies and Standards Set Out in the Digital
Millennium CopyrightAct Providea Solutionfor a Person Defamed Online?, 41 IDEA 259, 277
(2001).
49. See, e.g., Ryan King, Online Defamation:Bringingthe CommunicationsDecency Act of
1996 in Line with Sound Public Policy, 2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 24, Introduction (2003)
(promoting the CDA "to include a broad definition of 'development' and a 'take-down and putback' provision."); Butler, supranote 11 (discussing the benefits of DMCA-style liability); Hallet,
supranote 48 (same); Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The CommunicationsDecency Act of 1996: Why
§ 230 is Outdatedand PublisherLiabilityfor Defamation Should be Reinstated Against Internet
Service Providers, 8 U. Prrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3 (2007). But see H. Brian Holland, In Defense
of Online Intermediary Immunity: FacilitatingCommunities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U.
KAN. L. REv. 369 (2008) (defending broad § 230 immunity); Susan Freiwald, Comparative
InstitutionalAnalysisin Cyberspace: The CaseoflntermediaryLiabilityforDefamation,14 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 569, 597, 654-55 (2001) (finding that comparative institutional analysis suggests
Congress should amend the CDA to restore intermediary liability).
50. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 1, at 263.
51. Further complicating the determination of whether something is defamatory on the
Internet is whether it is defamatory based on the audience. A statement is not necessarily
defamatory if it was published to an audience (common mind) that considered it very positive,
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but absolute immunity inevitably results in the chilling of some speech."52
However, the biggest problem with these DMCA-style distributor liability
proposals
is that they generally require Congress to act and amend the
53
CDA.

E. The Problem Of CongressionalAction
Any solution requiring statutory change requires congressional
action-something that is very difficult to generate based only on
scholarly, legal commentary.54 While there may be exceptions to the rule,
Congress generally does not act just because law professors or law
students suggest reform, even if it is a really good idea." There are many
reasons that Congress has failed to act. There is the inertia that must be
overcome to start a bill down the path to becoming a law, the distraction
of other more pressing issues, and the complexity that starts to arise when
different interest groups must be pleased and an idea has to be codified
into an actual statute. Special interest groups, particularly the big ISPs and
web content providers, would lobby hard to keep any liability or extra
costs from being imposed on them. No one represents the defamed before
Congress. With online defamation "the consequences are left absorbed by

while the plaintiff or others considered the statement offensive, such as when the Jews for Jesus
newsletter falsely claimed that a traditional Jew had converted to Christianity. Business Defamation
and Disparagement, 19 Bus. TORTS REP. 103, 106 (2007) (discussing Rapp v. Jews for Jesus Inc.,
944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
52. Sheridan, supra note 11, at 178.
53. See, e.g., Miree Kim, Narrowingthe Definition of an InteractiveService ProviderUnder
§ 230 of the CommunicationsDecencyAct, 2003 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 33102 (suggesting
that "Congress should narrow the definition of an ISP by allowing courts to engage in a three factor
balancing test."); Blumstein, supranote 32, at 425 ("Congress should clarify its intent by enacting
CDA guidelines that follow traditional common law standards of liability for distributors who are
on notice of the defamatory material."); Hallet, supra note 48, at 279 (calling on "Congress to
amend the CDA"); Langdon, supra note 46, at 853 ("Congress needs to rethink the impact of
section 230 on defamation actions, abolish it, and return to the common law publisher distributor
distinctions.").
54. A solution could also come in the form of an international treaty. The European Union
utilizes a form of a notice and take-down requiring ISPs to remove tortuous material. Michael L.
Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Internet Law: Lessons from Europe, 9 No. 11 J.
INTERNET L. 3, 6-7 (2006).
55. For example, Brian Kalt identified a problem in federal law that allowed for serious
felonies in a small portion of Idaho to go unpunished and proposed a simple legislative fix for this
serious problem. He was basically ignored and Congress has yet to fix the potentially dangerous
legal loophole. See Brian C. Kalt, Tabloid Constitutionalism:How a Bill Doesn'tBecome a Law,
96 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1971 (2008).
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an unfortunate few members of the general public."56 In the last decade,
these unfortunate people have not been sufficiently organized, wealthy, or
notable enough to overcome the inertia, special interest politics, and noise
generated by other issues to move Congress to amend § 230 of the CDA.
F. Other Solutions
Federal courts could narrow their interpretation of § 230 to bring it
within reason." However, reversing past decisions, or admitting the
decision was wrong by narrowing its holding without the courage to
overrule it, hurts the credibility of the court system. If not from Congress
or the courts, perhaps a solution could come from the Internet companies
themselves, specifically Google. "Common sense dictates that an ISP will
not waste its time and money monitoring content over the Internet when
it will suffer no repercussions from failing to do so."58 One commentator
proposed using the style of DMCA's notice and take-down provision
(which puts penalty of perjury on someone who falsely asserts it) to
provide notice to Google that it was promoting such material, thus
defusing the "Google bomb."59 Although public pressure explains why
ISPs voluntarily take some material down, pressure alone is not enough to
make Google assist defamation victims more broadly. It would take
Congressional action to impose a notice and take-down provision on
Google's search results.
If the status quo is unacceptable, Congress will not act, and the federal
courts cannot act; perhaps a solution can come from the states. As
laboratories of democracy, state governments can be more responsive and
innovative than the federal legislature. Of course, states cannot amend §
230. Though defamation is a matter of state law,6° more creative state

56. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 1, at 255.
57. See, e.g., Andrea L. Julian, Comment, Freedom of Libel: How an Expansive
Interpretationof47 US.C. § 230 Affects the Defamation Victim in the Ninth Circuit,40 IDAHO L.
REV. 509 (2004) (advocating a narrow interpretation of § 230's immunity); Karen A. Horowitz,
When is § 230 Immunity Lost?: The TransformationFrom Website Owner to Information Content
Provider,3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 14 (2007) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit's decision to
interpret § 230 immunity more narrowly when a site tailored third-party content for its own
purposes as suggested by some legal commentators could be a part of a larger trend).
58. Myers, supra note 9, at 683.
59. Stephen Horowitz, Defusing a Google Bomb, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 37 (2007).
60. For instance, a state could subsidize Internet speech by treating it as slander instead of
libel because it would require plaintiffs to prove special damages, thus "defamation plaintiffs will
generally benefit from having a communication treated as libel, while defamation defendants will
prefer that a court treat a statement as slander." Anthony Ciolli, DefamatoryInternet Speech: A
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attempts to go after online defamation could come into problems with the
Dormant Commerce Clause.6 ' States get to make manyjudgment calls as
long as they do not go beyond the constitutional standard.6 2 Congress has
exempted the intermediaries from liability, but states have the power to
make it easier to punish the guilty parties who actually posted the
defamatory material. Plaintiffs are now bringing suits in state courts to
expose the defamatory posters because this is their only way to stop the
spread of damaging untruths.63
State courts develop the standards for subpoenas to ISPs and message
board operators to reveal the real identity of the poster, but they have
reached different conclusions on the appropriate standard.' State courts
and legislatures could adopt new, clearer uniform standards that make it
easier for an injured party to identify the perpetrator, while still respecting
the First Amendment by retaining stronger standards for public figure
plaintiffs. Successfully exposing defamers will deter future defamation. It
is possible, though, to abuse these subpoenas and to expose those who
should rightfully remain hidden.

III. SUBPOENAS IN JOHN DOE SUITS

A. Suits Are Actually Being Filed
"John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant ' 65 as lawsuits
targeting anonymous posters of defamatory material are filed, including

Defense of the Status Quo, 25 QuINNIPIAC L. REV. 853,853-54 (2007) (rejecting the idea of treating
Internet speech as slander).
61. See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding
that "the unique nature of cyberspace necessitates uniform national treatment and bars the states
from enacting inconsistent regulatory schemes" in striking down a New York child protection
statute).
62. For instance, states may not impose liability without some showing of fault and may not
impose presumed or punitive damages without a showing of actual malice. Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) ("We hold that,
so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious
to a private individual."). States may not "permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages"
without showing knowing or reckless conduct. Id.at 349.
63. Jay Eisenhofer & Sidney Liebesman, Caught by the Net: What to Do ifa Message Board
Messes with Your Client, 10 Bus. L. TODAY 40, 42 (2000).
64. See infra Part III.D.
65. Lyrissa Lidsky, SilencingJohnDoe: Defamation & Discoursein Cyberspace,49 DUKE.
L.J. 855, 855 (2000).
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those too critical of a corporation.66 Posts on financial or stock discussion
message boards are targeted as "more and more public companies are
resorting to litigation to put an end to these postings."67 Corporations take
their online reputation seriously and will go to court to protect it.68 Using
the courthouse as a form of redress, a corporation can protect its reputation
by "filing a John Doe suit, compelling discovery from the message-board
host, identifying the wrongdoers and taking appropriate legal action
' John Doe suits have been used to identify
against the proper parties."69
employees leaking internal information,70 to respond to accusations that a
CEO had been arrested for taking kickbacks,7 ' in response to criticism of
management, business practices, and the personal lives of executives, 72 and
to reveal the identity of a message board user who called a corporation's
management "blind, stupid and incompetent. ....
"" Elected officials are
not above bringing these actions to expose anonymous online critics, even
when the statements are "plainly inactionable as a matter of law."74
B. The Use Of Subpoenas in John Doe Lawsuits
"The practical effect of these interpretations of section 230 of the CDA
is to leave Internet defamation victims with no deep pocket to sue."75
Basically, John Doe "is the only person left to sue."76 Subpoenas allow
"the plaintiff [to] go to the source and sue the person who originated the
defamatory communication, even if that person is an unknown John
Doe."77 Corporate plaintiffs are usually looking to reveal the identity of the
66. "It is well settled that acorporation may be defamed." Elkin, supranote 5, at 22; see, e.g.,
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Howard, 487 S.W.2d 708, 712 (Tex. 1972) (holding that a
corporation may be libeled); Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1328 n.3 (5th Cir.
1993) (same).
67. Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 63, at 42.
68. See, e.g, Elkin, supra note 5, at 22; Ciarlone & Wiechmann, supra note 17 (discussing
corporate strategies to go after anonymous online defamers).
69. Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 63, at 42.
70. Elkin, supra note 5, at 24-25.
71. Id.at 25.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 24.
74. Court Denies Disclosure of Anonymous Blogger on Google Website in Defamation
Action, 11/16/2007 N.Y.L.J. col. 3, at 29; see also Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. Super. Ct.
2005).
75. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 871-72.
76. Id. at 872.
77. Id.; Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the Blogosphere: New
Solutionsfor an Old Problem, 44 DUQ. L. REv. 607, 639 (2006).
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speaker, not to get money.7 Corporations pursue these actions even though
"libel suits are hard to win but easy to bring."79 Tort law raises high
obstacles before the First Amendment issues even get a chance to weaken
the plaintiff's chance of winning. 0 Only a small fraction of libel suits are
successful,"' and defendants in defamation lawsuits are probably not
collectible. 2 Online defamers are effectively judgment-proof because "the
typical John Doe has neither deep pockets nor libel insurance from which
to satisfy a defamation judgment." 3 But, defamed businesses that are
going forward with these suits are more concerned "about repairing a
damaged reputation than collecting financial awards."84 Corporate suits are
often about re-establishing their name and countering the defamatory
8
speech.
There are substantial psychological benefits to filing a libel lawsuit-it
announces to the world that the statements are false, it might stop the
defamation, and it can achieve symbolic victories that actually matter to
the plaintiff. 6 Corporations can use these suits as part of a "public
relations campaign."8 7 Moreover, exposing the anonymous defamatory
poster could lead to the loss of a job, which may be an appropriate
punishment in such situations. 8 "The mere fact of being uncovered may
itself be enough to stop the alleged defamer from posting further

The CDA does not stand as an absolute bar to lawsuits brought as a result of
postings on the internet [sic]. Rather, it is a bar only against suing the ISP. While
a victim of cyber-defamation may not be able to sue the deep pocket, he can
certainly sue the poster.
Id.
78. Megan M. Sunkel, Comment, And the ISPs Have it... But How Does One Get It?
Examining the Lack of Standardsfor Ruling on Subpoenas Seeking to Reveal the Identity of
Anonymous Internet Users in Claims of Online Defamation, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1195 (2003);
Lidsky, supra note 65, at 855 (noting that "suits are not even arguably about recovering money
damages").
79. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 883.
80. Id.at 874.
81. Id. at 875.
82. Elkin, supra note 5, at 26.
83. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 859.
84. Elkin, supra note 5, at 26.
85. Id.
86. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 876.
87. Id.
88. Id.at 868 (discussing a Penn State University employee who defamed HealthSouth's
CEO and his wife).
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messages." 9 In John Doe suits the exposure is the punishment-an
effective subpoena is really the outcome of the suit.
Of course, it is not procedurally easy to expose the defamer. Yahoo!
and other Internet companies will try to avoid revealing identities, but will
do so to comply with a court order or subpoena.9° After instituting a John
Doe suit, a plaintiff will need to secure subpoenas against the Internet
companies and may need to proceed with multiple rounds.9 After the first
round reveals e-mail addresses or IP addresses, a second round of
subpoenas (and even a third) may be needed to find the actual identity of
the poster.92 Yahoo!, AOL, and other website hosts have the e-mail
addresses of the people posting on their message boards (not just the
message board screen name). Once a plaintiff has this information, he or
she can in turn subpoena the ISP that owns those e-mail addresses to get
the real-world identity.93 Plaintiffs have been advised to provide as much
information as possible to the subpoenaed ISP so they can be more helpful
in complying.94
The subpoenaed Internet company will likely attempt to give notice to
the poster that his or her identity is going to be revealed. Cable companies
providing Internet access are required under 47 U.S.C. 551(c)(2) to
provide notice to their subscriber before disclosing his or her identity to a
third party and may only do so under a court order. Some courts have
explicitly required notice for all anonymous poster subpoenas.95 A site that
turns over someone's identity without notifying the anonymous poster may
themselves be sued for failure to protect anonymity.9 6 Today, ISPs give
notice before disclosure.97 Plaintiffs should "know that the ISPs are
receiving many subpoenas daily, and yours likely will just enter the queue,
similar to a subpoena to a telephone company."98
Even where allowed, John Doe suits are very difficult.9 9 Going after an
anonymous defamer is "a long, uphill battle for injured companies,""1 ° and

89. Id. at 881-82.
90. Elkin, supra note 5, at 24.
91. Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supranote 63, at 45.
92. Id.
93. Elkin, supra note 5, at 24.
94. Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 63, at 45.
95. See Part III.D, infra.
96. Rappaport & Leith, supra note 16, at 35.
97. Antonia Hambli & Orit Goldring, Note, Think Before You Click: OnlineAnonymity Does
Not Make DefamationLegal, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 383, 394-97 (2003).
98. Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supranote 63, at 45.
99. Sunkel, supra note 78, at 1198-1200.
100. Id. at 1190.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 13

unexpected problems can arise. Some states have discovery rules, like
Federal Rule 26, that require an attorney to meet with opposing counsel
before starting discovery, but how do you confer with John Doe's
counsel?'' While a company might use the nature of the Internet to get
jurisdiction in an inconvenient forum to drive up costs and silence a
critic, 1 2 it may also be difficult to get jurisdiction over John Doe. 10 3 These
suits raise jurisdiction problems that are beyond the scope of this
Article." The combination of these difficulties is so great that counsel
generally advises against online defamation litigation."0 5 A plaintiff could
end up receiving negative publicity for suing,"' and "chat-room authors
may appear quite sympathetic in the courtroom."'0 7 Moreover, the
defamation defendant could actually fight back and seek corporate records
through discovery to prove that her posts were accurate and true. 108
C. The ConstitutionalProtection OfDefamatory and
Anonymous Speech
"The history of defamation law is largely driven by the application of
the First Amendment to the doctrines of libel and slander."'0 9 The
constitutional protections related to defamation focus on the outcome,
rather than the early stages and filing of the suit."0 The requirements for
a defamation case, rather than standards for discovery, have been
established as constitutional issues.1 Recognizing the "breathing space"
the First Amendment requires, the Supreme Court has intervened in state

101. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) ("Timing and Sequence of Discovery. (1) Timing. A party may not
seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule (2c)f...");
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f); Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 63, at 45. You would want to move for
a court exemption from the "meet and confer" requirement and seek expedited consideration. Id.
102. See Trende, supra note 77, at 632.
103. See generally David Schulz & Madeleine Schachter, Publishing Without Borders:
Internet Jurisdictional Issues, Internet Choice of Law Issues, ISP Immunity, and On-Line
Anonymous Speech, 651 PLI/Pat 9 (2001).
104. See, e.g., id.; Counts & Martin, supranote 37, at 1115-32.
105. Elkin, supra note 5, at 26.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 25 ("In an unusual twist, one of the defendants is fighting back, demanding access
to corporate records to prove that her postings were accurate.").
109. Medenica & Wahab, supra note 1, at 241.
110. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 904-05.
111. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964) (requiring actual malice
before a public figure can recover, but not discussing discovery).
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defamation law. l l2 While the Court has recognized the need for
constitutional protection in suits where the plaintiff is a private figure, it
invoked the strongest constitutional protections when the plaintiff was a
public figure. 3 Applying defamation law to speech involving public
figures and public officials is where there is the greatest risk of
constitutional harm and the greatest need for First Amendment
protection. 114 However, "this does not mean that any speech
about a public
' 15
figure is immune from sanction in the form of damages." "
"This breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows
public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can prove
both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the
requisite level of culpability."' 6 The requirement for clear and convincing
proof of actual malice is "an extremely powerful antidote to the
inducement to media self-censorship ... -1' The Supreme Court has
mandated that under the First Amendment different defamation plaintiffs
must be treated differently."' They have found "no difficulty in
distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs.""' 9 This disparate treatment
protects core speech but also recognizes that public figures have greater

112. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272; Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975) (holding that
First Amendment prevents state from imposing civil liability on media for publicizing identity of
rape victim).
113. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (requiring clear and
convincing proof that broadcaster defendant published defamatory statement about a private
individual on a matter of public concern with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsehood);
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (holding that private-figure
plaintiff bears burden of proving falsity in defamation action on a matter of public concern).
114. Plaintiffs can sometimes sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the same
facts as libel. See Lidsky, supra note 65, at 867. Other torts may also be plead based on speech. See,
e.g., Morganroth v. Whitehall, 411 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1987) (discussing "false light" invasion of
privacy). In Hustler, the plaintifffiled both an intentional infliction of emotional distress and a libel
claim in response to the same conduct. However, the Court held that a public figure cannot recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress without being required to show the same
requirements (malice and falsity) required to recover for defamation. Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 56 (1988).
115. Id. (emphasis original).
116. Id. (emphasis original).
117. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
118. The U.S. Supreme Court and state courts have also considered the subject matter of the
published information, not just the identity of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Winstead v. Sweeney, 517
N.W.2d 874, 876 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing newsworthiness and matters of public interest
as a "constitutional privilege").
119. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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access to the media, stronger communication and response abilities, and
are generally able to use self-help more reliably. 2 °
Moreover, because private individuals have greater vulnerability, a
state's interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.' 2 ' The Court
has found "a compelling normative consideration underlying the
distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs."' 22 Because,
by thrusting themselves into the public debate (willingly or sometimes
unwillingly), "they invite attention and comment."' 21 3 Ultimately, "public
men, are, as it were, public property."' 24
Anonymity also has a constitutional component. When considering
anonymity and the Internet, lower "courts generally have protected the
identity of posters based on their right to speak anonymously."' 25 They
recognized a First Amendment right to anonymous speech and provided
their analysis in light of this right.'2 6 The Supreme Court has yet to address
online anonymity, but has previously spoken favorably about anonymity
in general.
In striking down an Ohio statute that prohibited anonymous election
campaigning, the Court recognized a long history of anonymous speech in
this country (going back to the FederalistPapers) and afforded such

120. Id.; Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (noting that public figure had
"sufficient access to the means of counterargument" to counter defamatory statements). One of the
dominant rationales for the public figure doctrine is that these figures command significant media
attention which allows them to respond to and clear up defamatory statements made against them.
Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring
Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 833, 842 (2006). Their stronger self-help abilities shift the balance
"in favor of robust public debate." Id. at 843.
121. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 345.
124. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,268 (1964) (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952).
125. Rappaport & Leith, supra note 16, at 34.
126. See, e.g., Dendritelnt'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 771 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
("when evaluating a plaintiff's request to compel an ISP to disclose the identity of a John Doe
subscriber, courts may depart from traditionally-applied legal standards in analyzing the
appropriateness of such disclosure in light of the First Amendment implications"); Immunodemics,
Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773, 776 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("well-established First
Amendment right to speak anonymously"); Doe v. 2TheMart.Com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("The anonymity of Internet speech is protected by the First
Amendment."); Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377, at *5 (Va.
2001) (considering whether "the potential loss of the anonymity of the John Does, would constitute
an unreasonable intrusion on their First Amendment rights"); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456
(Del. 2005) ("Anonymous [I]ntemet speech in blogs or chat rooms in some instances can become
the modem equivalent of political pamphleteering.").
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speech constitutional protection.' 27 The Court held that "an author's
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions
or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment."' 28 It was the author, not the
state, who got "to decide whether or not to disclose his or her true
identity."' 29
There are many commentators willing to lavish praise on anonymous
speech, not just for its historical significance in America, but for its
present value. Anonymity means "the audience must evaluate the
speaker's ideas based on her words alone."' 3 ° Rather than the author's
reputation coming first, anonymous work is judged based on its own merit,
and is received with less bias.' "The Internet is therefore a powerful tool
for equalizing imbalances of power" because it allows common people to
post material that will be received by wide audiences.'32 Anonymity
further "disguises status indicators such as race, class, gender, ethnicity,
and age, which allow elite speakers to dominate real-world discourse."' 3 3
Even so-called "Bitch Sites" may add something of value to the economy
by making more information available.' 34 Students use anonymous forms
to evaluate professors and discuss job offers.' 35 "Anonymity ensures a
diversity of viewpoints in cyberspace."' 136 Despite all this celebration of the
anonymous online speaker,
"[t]he fact is that absolute anonymity on the
137
Internet does not exist.'
Everything can be tracked in one way or another, and John Doe
anonymous defamation suits seek to use the legal process to make IP
addresses give way to real home addresses. To some, the John Doe suits,
which often involved a rich plaintiff and a poor defendant, "threaten to
"' The threat
reestablish existing hierarchies of power" over the Internet. 38
of exposure carries the potential to chill free speech. In general, the First
Amendment gives "breathing space" to junk speech and Internet garbage

127. McIntyre v. Ohio Elects. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
128. Id. at 342.
129. Id. at 341.
130. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 896.
131. Slitt, supra note 7, at 416; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (noting the American law school
practice of blind grading law exams).
132. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 860.
133. Id. at 896.
134. See Hambli & Goldring, supra note 97, at 387-91.
135. Horowitz, supra note 57, at 37.
136. Hambli & Goldring, supra note 97, at 384.
137. Id. at 385.
138. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 861.
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to allow for and protect meaningful discourse. 39 The John Does who add
something meaningful will stop contributing as others have their privacy
stripped away and are sued for their criticism. The constitutional
protections afforded to anonymity and potential defamatory speech
encourage free speech and prevent private parties from using the tools of
the state to silence critics.
These defamation suits are primarily about silencing John Doe. But, of
course, this is a "perfectly legitimate" goal when used to "stop an
onslaught of offensive and damaging untruths."'" The problem is the
potential for these suits to go too far and silence those who ought not be
silenced. Even if the state does not ban online anonymity, litigation can
have almost the same effect. First Amendment freedoms, which the right
to be anonymous is a part of, can be depleted by private individuals, doing
what the government cannot, as a "heckler's veto."' 4 ' While many of the
anonymous online defamation suits are corporate plaintiffs seeking to
silence their critics, private figures are being defamed too. Injured private
citizens need standards, consistent from state to state, which make it easier
to expose their tormentors but those standards should also prevent
powerful corporations and public figures from silencing critics by
threatening exposure.
D. Courts FashionStandards
No single standard has been developed to guide courts in issuing a
subpoena to reveal an anonymous poster's identity. Recognizing the
conflict between First Amendment rights and the right of plaintiffs to
recover, different jurisdictions have reached sharply different conclusions
about what a plaintiff must show.
A Virginia trial court, finding itself required to decide "whether a
state's interest in protecting its citizens against potentially actionable
communications on the Internet is sufficient to outweigh the right to
anonymously speak" decided to keep defamers from "hiding behind an
illusory shield ofpurported First Amendment rights." '42 The circuit court's
standard was to inquire whether, based on the pleadings or evidence, there

139. Id.at 893.

140. Id.at 881.
141. Butler, supra note 11, at 260.
142. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570,2000 WL 1210372, at *5-6
(Va Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co.,
542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
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is a good faith basis that the conduct is actionable and the subpoenaed
information is "centrally needed to advance that claim."' 43
In Dendrite,a publicly traded company sought to reveal posters on a
Yahoo! message board discussing its stock. 144 The New Jersey court
established a standard that required the plaintiff to set forth the exact
defamatory statement and establish a prima facie cause of action with
specific evidence supporting each element. 45 Under Dendrite, the court
must give the defendant notice and balance the need for disclosure against
the anonymous speaker's First Amendment rights on a case by case
basis. 146
When faced with a subpoena to expose criticism of an elected official,
Delaware adopted the rule in Doe v. Cahill that "a defamation plaintiff
must satisfy a 'summary judgment' standard before obtaining the identity
of an anonymous defendant."' 47 The plaintiff must provide enough
evidence to defeat a hypothetical motion for summary judgment. "In other
words, the defamation plaintiff, as the party bearing the burden of proof
at trial, must introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact
for all elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiff's control."'48
This means that, although the plaintiff does not have to plead actual
malice,' 49 the plaintiff must establish that there is a genuine issue of
material fact on every issue to move forward and reveal the identity of the
defendant.
A federal district court, recognizing a lack of persuasive authority in
this area, developed a test for "evaluating a civil subpoena that seeks the
identity of an anonymous Internet user who is not a party to the underlying
litigation."' 50 Before issuing the subpoena, a court considers whether the
subpoena was issued in good faith and not for an improper purpose, relates

143. Id. at *8.
144. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756,760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). See also
Immunodemics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773,774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), Jennifer O'Brien,
Note, Puttinga Face to a (Screen) Name: The FirstAmendment Implications of Compelling ISPs
to Reveal the Identity ofAnonymous InternetSpeakers in Online Defamation Cases, 70 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2745, 2769-70 (2002) (supporting uniform adoption of the Dendrite standard); Sunkel,
supra note 78, at 1209 (calling this standard "very high, but not insurmountable standard for the
plaintiff to succeed with a subpoena on the ISP").
145. Dendrite,775 A.2d at 760.
146. Id. at 760-61.
147. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,457 (Del. 2005) (also requiring that the defendant be given
notice). See also Malloy, supra note 19, at 1193 (criticizing this standard as too strict).
148. Cahill, 844 A.2d at 463.
149. Id.
150. Doe v. 2THEMART.Com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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to a core claim or defense, is directly and materially relevant, and the
information sought is sufficient to establish or disprove a claim or defense
that is unavailable from another source.'51
A court can look at the content itself to see if it is actionable'52 or
consider how hard the plaintiff has worked to otherwise identify the
defendant. 5 3 In the past, at least one court has required a plaintiff to show
a compelling interest if the subpoena will chill speech.' 54 These cases have
reached different standards and, though involving different statements,
generally involved either a publicly traded company being discussed on
message boards devoted to its stock or a public official.
E. The StandardsOthers Are Proposing
Uniform standards could come from a Supreme Court ruling addressing
the issue from a constitutional perspective, but in the meantime lower
courts must develop standards.' 55 These standards should be fashioned in
light of the constitutional protection of anonymity and the need for
breathing room in defamation law to avoid chilling free speech. There is
also a real need for an "established burden to meet" when a party seeks a
subpoena to identify an online poster. 56
' Congress could establish rules for
such subpoenas by law. And, while Congress might not care what legal
commentators have to say on this either,'57 such legislation probably would
not face the same fight from institutional actors that repealing § 230
immunity would. Nevertheless, standards will probably be adopted first in
states and in lower courts forced to confront this issue. It is in these courts
151. Id.
152. Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. Does, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(looking at totality of the circumstances to decide that the alleged defamatory material was only
opinion, not provable as factually wrong, and rejecting subpoenas because the statement was
inactionable as a matter of law).
153. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-79 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(establishing test for subpoena revealing identity in a trademark violation case, requiring: 1.
pleading with specificity to show the defendant is real, 2. showing all previous steps to locate
defendant, and 3. showing that the plaintiff's suit could withstand a motion to dismiss).
154. Sunkel, supra note 78, at 1196 (citing In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 819 F.2d 1137 tbl.
(4th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court)).
155. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 945.
156. Sunkel, supra note 78, at 1214.
157. For instance, it has not reacted to the strongly worded order that "[s]ociety mandates that
Congress enact a law that can be applied uniformly to cases where a plaintiff-corporation is seeking
the identity of anonymous Internet posters." Hamblin & Goldring, supra note 97, at 418; Shaun
Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits andJohn Doe Subpoenas:BalancingAnonymity andAccountability
in Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 517 (2001) (suggesting Congress
adopt a prima facie evidence and notice standard).
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that attorneys may adopt ideas from commentators in their briefs and help
craft standards.
One commentator advocates using a reporter's privilege standard.'58
The reporter's privilege is a qualified one. To overcome a motion to quash
the subpoena of a reporter: "(1) the information sought must be relevant
(2) the information sought must not be obtainable by alternative means,
and (3) there must be a compelling need for the information."' 59 The
reporter's privilege, though, is something the courts have extended
because of a policy consideration that favors people talking to reporters to
preserve the freedom of the press or because anonymity allows leaks of
government wrong-doing. Either way, it is a policy that encourages talking
to reporters. The policy interest behind encouraging online anonymity in
general and potentially defamatory speech in particular is not necessarily
as strong as the policy interest behind encouraging investigative
journalism. Moreover, a reporter's privilege-style test for subpoenas in a
John Doe suit would be meaningless. The plaintiff always has a
compelling need for the identity of the person he or she is trying to sue.
Another commentator advocates deploying "the opinion privilege" at
early stages of litigation to protect statements that do not include an
assertion of fact so that speakers will not self-censor. 6 ' Specifically,
judges should not allow subpoenas based on statements that, by their own
words, could not be verified. 6 ' Along similar lines are the anti-SLAPP
statutes. A SLAPP, or Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation,
seeks to silence a critic. The anti-SLAPP statutes make it easier and thus
cheaper to terminate such a lawsuit at early stages. 162 Most states now have
anti-SLAPP statutes, 63 and some states advocate for federal anti-SLAPP
legislation. "6These laws are needed because otherwise, "by the time the
judge rules on a motion to dismiss, expensive, time-consuming, and

158. Sunkel, supranote 78, at 1213-18.
159. Pinkard v. Johnson, 118 F.R.D. 517,521 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (noting "the more confidential
the information sought, the greater the First Amendment protection"); see Sunkel, supra note 78,
at 1213-18.
160. Lidsky, supra note 65, at 919-20.
161. Id. at 933-36.
162. See, e.g., Hamblin & Goldring, supra note 97, at 410-12; Joshua R. Furman, Comment,
Cybersmear orCyber-SLAPP: AnalyzingDefamationSuits Against OnlineJohn Does as Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation,25 SEAT-rLE U. L. REv. 213, 215-16 (2001); Lidsky, supra
note 65, at 945, Ciarlone & Wiechmann, supra note 17, at 56-57.
163. The California Anti-SLAPP project maintains a list ofanti-SLAPP statutes, availableat
http://www.casp.net/statutes/ menstate.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2008).
164. Trende, supra note 77, at 635-49.
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potentially embarrassing discovery will already have taken place.' 65 An
anti-SLAPP statute allows a motion to strike early on in free expression
claims, which saves time and money, protects speech, and can even be
brought by a non-party asserting a right to remain anonymous. 166 In
litigation over postings on stock message boards, a judge could look at the
167
motive or goal of the corporation filing the suit to see if it chills speech.
Beyond making it easier to dismiss nuisance suits that threaten speech,
courts could engage in fee shifting under SLAPP and
more extensive use
68
of Rule 11 sanctions to discourage such litigation.
Courts and commentators recognize that, even with a regime that
makes it difficult to reveal an identity or easier to dismiss a nuisance suit,
it is important to give notice to the person whose identity will be revealed.
Notice gives a potential defendant the time to quickly hire an attorney and
respond. Under their terms of service many ISPs already provide notice to
a subscriber before granting such a subpoena, but "[i]t is insufficient to
leave the issue of notice up to an ISP.' ' 69 ISPs are focused primarily on
making a profit and are not17necessarily concerned with whether someone
will get hurt by disclosure.
F. My Proposal:DistinguishingAmong Plaintiffs at the Early Stage
It would be ideal for Congress to pass legislation establishing
nationwide standards for these subpoenas as a way to prevent forum
shopping and ensure fairness.17 1 State legislatures could also act
proactively to address the matter, but in their absence courts will be forced
to fashion standards. These standards must meet the dual challenges of
protecting the First Amendment breathing room that the

165. Id.at 639.
166. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(3), Rancho Publ'ns v. Super Ct., 68 Cal. App. 4th
1538, 1451 (4th Dis. App. Ct. 1999); Trende, supra note 77, at 642-45.
167. Sunkel, supra 78, at 1193.
168. Federal Rule 11 requires attorneys to sign and verify their pleadings and authorizes a
court to impose sanctions on an attorney or a party for filing offensive claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
169. Hamblin & Goldring, supra note 97, at 396-97.
170. Id. So once again a commentator orders "Congress... to address this issue and require
ISPs to issue mandatory notice to anonymous posters whose identity is on the verge of being
revealed." Id.
at 397. As mentioned before, cable companies providing Internet services are already
required to provide notice under 47 U.S.C. 551 (c)(2).
171. Congressional authority to regulate subpoenas in state courts could come from the
Interstate Commerce Clause or from the 14th Amendment's § 5 power to protect civil liberties
against state action. In addition to the problem of forum shopping by plaintiffs, patch-work state
regulation would encourage more defamatory material to pop up in states more protective of
anonymity.
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constitutionalization of defamation law is designed to maintain and the
right to speak anonymously, while still enabling injured parties to recover
for defamation. One way to meet these dual challenges is to treat different
plaintiffs differently at early stages of litigation for the same reason they
are treated different at later stages.
By establishing different standards for public and private figures,
courts can prevent the chilling of free speech and still make recovery
easier for defamed individuals. If the concern is that public figures
(including politicians and corporations) will use these subpoenas to silence
critics, then courts should make it more difficult for them to compel
disclosure. Similarly, if private plaintiffs find the hurdles too difficult to
obtain recovery, then courts should make it easier for them to gain access
to the information.
The cases where state courts have had to fashion standards so far have
involved public figure plaintiffs.'72 The Supreme Court recognized that a
state's interest in protecting a reputation is greater with private figures.173
Public figures have greater access to the media and are more capable of
responding to defamatory material through counter-speech. The First
Amendment interest is stronger when the speech is directed at a public
figure anonymously because the public figure's stature, power, and access
to the media may be the reason for criticizing anonymously in the first
place. These factors explain why public figures are treated differently from
private figures in defamation law.
To recover for defamation, a public figure must demonstrate actual
malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth), 174 while
a private figure is only required by constitutional law to prove
negligence-this is the test that derives from New York Times v.
Sullivan.1 75 This means that in certain cases the public or private figure

172. The New Jersey and Virginia cases were publicly traded corporations suing about
statements made on message boards discussing the company and their management. Dendrite Int'l,
Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 759-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum
to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other
grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). The
Delaware case involved a local elected official. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 467 (Del. 2005).
173. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) ("Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.").
174. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964)
175. As a matter of state law a private figure plaintiff could be required to show more. Gertz
v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) ("so long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster ofdefamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."); see also State v. Carpenter,
171 P.3d 41, 82-83 (Alaska 2007) (recognizing that after Gertz most states have adopted a
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distinction will be outcome determinative. Given the exact same evidence,
a private figure may be able to establish liability where a public figure may
not. The Court established these standards realizing they would be
outcome determinative, observing that "[p]lainly many deserving
plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury,
will be unable
176
to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test."'
Defamation suits are difficult to win and even if the plaintiff wins,
defendants probably do not have the assets to satisfy a judgment. These
suits are about exposing the critic. The exposure or threat thereof is
enough to stop the criticism. The exposure, not the judgment, is the real
outcome in John Doe suits. Recognizing that, the same public and private
figure distinction that influences the outcome in terms of what must be
established at trial should influence the outcome of what must be
established to generate a subpoena in John Doe defamation suits. 177 The
difficulty with making this distinction between plaintiffs is that courts
would need to make the distinction at the early stage before discovery is
even done.178 However, there is already an established rubric to distinguish
between public and private figures and the judge,79 not the jury, decides who
is a public figure based on the facts presented.
A plaintiff seeking to reveal an anonymous poster should first plead
with specificity a prima facie case of defamation and establish evidence
that the plaintiff is not a public figure. Prior to issuing subpoenas to reveal
the defamatory poster, the court should hold a hearing to establish whether
the plaintiff is a public or private figure, which would then determine the
applicable standard. At this stage, the court should take a broad definition
of a public figure and should generally treat corporations as public
negligence standard to private-figure defamation suits, but instead opting to require actual malice
in such cases).
176. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
177. The public and private figure dichotomy should be applied to defamation-like suits such
as intentional infliction of emotional distress and false light invasion of privacy. See Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (applying constitutional protections to statutory false light and
invasion of privacy); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction
of emotional distress).
178. The potential for error is with a limited purpose public figure, which could be a close call
in a case like a college athletic coach. The test for determining whether a plaintiff is a limited
purpose public figure inquires whether the: (1) controversy at issue is publicly discussed and people
outside immediate participants will be impacted by its resolution; (2) plaintiff has more than a
trivial role in the controversy; and (3) alleged defamation is germane to the participation in that
controversy. See, e.g., WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998).
179. Elkin, supra note 5, at 24 (citing WFAA T.V. Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571
(Tex. 1998)). The doctrine is relative stable since "the public figure test remained substantially
unaltered in the three decades since its formulation." Perzanowski, supra note 120, at 834.
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figures. 8 ' Since John Doe has yet to be hailed into court, the judge should
treat these as ex parte proceedings.'
The rules of professional
responsibility already establish that "[i]n an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer
shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts
are adverse."'8 2
Public figures have access to the media and greater resources with
which to respond to defamation outside of the courthouse. Defamation law
should and does have less sympathy for them. However, it is possible to
advocate a standard that would be too hard for public figure plaintiffs to
meet. ' 3 Public figures should not be absolutely prohibited from seeking
any subpoenas for the same reason they are not absolutely prohibited from
recovering for defamation. The First Amendment requires breathing room,
but that breathing room can be achieved without an absolute ban on
recovery and punishment for defamatory speech about public figures. An
appropriate standard for a public figure defamation plaintiff to meet is the
Doe v. Cahill standard, which was drafted in response to a suit involving

180. See Lidsky, supranote 65, at 907-09 ("Regardless ofhow [publicly traded] corporations
should be treated generally, it is fair to conclude that a corporation should be treated as a public
figure when the alleged defamation appears in a forum dedicated to discussion of the corporation's
management and operation and is reasonably related to that subject."). Criticism of a company on
stock message boards was a public discussion under anti-SLAPP. Computer Express, Inc. v.
Jackson, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 628 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2001). Close corporations and other very
small entities that might be an exception to this general rule may also be small enough that a
defamatory comment about John Smith LLC is attributable as a comment about John Smith
personally so that he could proceed under his own name so long as the plaintiff could offer
evidence to demonstrate that the statement injured his reputation. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254,292 (1964) (requiring "evidence to connect the statements with "the plaintiff'); see also
RESTATEMENT 2D OF TORTS, § 564A (when defamation is referencing a group, the conduct is more
likely to be actionable when the group is small).
181. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377,380 (Va.
2001) (noting that the original Indiana court that authorized the third party subpoena was
proceeding exparte).
182. Model Rule 3.3(d) (Candor Toward the Tribunal).
183. Ryan Martin, Comment, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standardfor
Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1217, 1243 (2007).
[I]n defamation actions involving anonymous political speech, plaintiffs should
not be able to learn the identity of John Doe defendants unless plaintiffs can meet
the summary judgment standard and show that the defamatory language at issue
was of such an egregious nature that the plaintiff will likely be able to produce
evidence of actual malice at trial.
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an elected official. Because evidence of the defendant's state of mind is
not in the plaintiff's possession, the plaintiff must introduce evidence that
creates a genuine issue of material fact for every element other than actual
malice. This evidence would have to be sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment by the defendant.
For a public figure to move forward, the judge should first examine the
alleged defamatory statement and decide whether the statement is plainly
not actionable as a matter of law. Then the public figure should be required
to meet the Doe v. Cahill standard. The defendant should then be given
notice and thirty days to respond to block disclosure of his or her
identity. 84 This is a tough but appropriate burden for a public figure
plaintiff to meet.
Making this difficult standard apply to public figures only will
encourage them to claim private figure status. This is where judges must
enforce professional responsibility rules and actively punish attorneys who
misrepresent their client's status. By sanctioning attorneys who fail to
disclose or file frivolous claims, judges could get the word out that they
take the private and public figure determination very seriously and remind
attorneys to be honest about facts that could go either way. Certainly, some
close calls will come out incorrectly, and some attorneys will slip
questionable plaintiffs into private figure status, but even a few sanctions
will have a strong deterrent effect by keeping plaintiffs from sneaking into
the wrong category.
Private figures need an easier standard to meet if they are going to
effectively deter online defamation and have any chance of recovering for
their reputational injury. After pleading a prima facie case and establishing
private figure status (which is effectively to establish that the plaintiff is
not a public figure), plaintiffs should be able to move forward with a
subpoena. Even for private figures the defendant should receive notice and
thirty days to respond prior to disclosure. This easier standard for private
figures will lower the cost of litigation and recognizes that private figures
have less ability to respond with counterspeech and a correspondingly
greater need to respond in the courthouse. Even though filing a suit and
compelling disclosure may be too expensive for the common person, an
easier standard to meet lowers the cost of litigation and will lead to more

184. Anti-SLAPP laws will be most beneficial after the defendant has received notice. Even
still a poor defendant may have difficulty securing legal counsel. Amending anti-SLAPP statutes
to require the public figure plaintiff to post a bond before disclosure of identities might deter
inappropriate actions and make it easier for the defendant to secure counsel. See CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 2007) (awarding attorney's fees but not requiring plaintiff to post
a bond).
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disclosure and more deterrence. More news stories about anonymous
defamers being exposed and sued will cause people to realize that there is
not absolute anonymity online and will deter them from posting something
they might not post if their name were attached. Exposing the defamer will
subject him to shame and social sanctions. More importantly, it will bring
posting of online defamatory content more in line with offline defamation.
It may also chill some speech.
However, chilling actual defamatory postings are fully acceptable. My
proposal works best with anti-SLAPP legislation to further protect core
speech on matters of public concern. Even without such protections,
something must be done to make it easier for private parties to defend their
reputational interests. Otherwise we might end up with a solution far worse
than a few dissidents being exposed-like
criminal libel laws or the
85
entirely.
anonymity
of
banning
My proposed standards would restore some responsibility to Internet
speech by making it easier for private plaintiffs to identify and hold
accountable a party that has defamed them while still encouraging public
figures to respond through counterspeech using their superior media
access. For this standard to work, though, public figures must be treated
as such, and their attorneys must be held accountable if they attempt to
deceive the court about their status.
IV. CONCLUSION

The marketplace of ideas is about a competition where "competing
ideas collide, but out of which the truth eventually emerges. 18 6 The cloak
of anonymity, lack of consequences for the poster, and chaos on the
Internet created by defamation destroys the credibility of the information
presented and prevents the marketplace from functioning properly.
185. A Kentucky state legislator recently proposed prohibiting anonymous online posting.
Eugene Volokh, Kentucky Lawmaker Wants to Make Anonymous InternetPostingIllegal,available

at http://volokh.com/posts/1205170371.shtml (last visited Aug. 7,2008). The text ofthe legislation
is also available online at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/08RS/HB775/bill. doc (last visited Aug.
7, 2008). A criminal complaint was filed against a blogger in Texas for posting anonymously in
violation of Texas Election Code § 255.005. Laylan Copelin, CriminalComplaint Will be Filedin
DA's Race, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Apr. 4, 2008). See also Pincus, supra note 37, at 288
(discussing Concept of "voluntary" anonymity-free cyberzones); Butler, supra note 11, at 26
(discussing state or federal law restricting anonymous speech); Noah Levine, Note, Establishing
Legal Accountabilityfor Anonymous Communication in Cyberspace, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 1526,

1537 (1996) (noting proposals involving strict government control and complete prohibition of
anonymous remailers).
186. Ciarlone & Wiechmann, supra note 17, at 52.
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Chilling speech can be more damaging to the marketplace of ideas. While
these suits are frequently advised against, public figures are filing and
using them to expose their critics. The Supreme Court has recognized that
public and private figures ought to be treated differently through
defamation law in ways that influence the outcome of the suit. When the
outcome sought is simply to expose the critic, as it is in most John Doe
suits, the same principle should be applied at the early stage of litigation.
Protecting political discourse by establishing difficult standards for public
figure plaintiffs and discouraging defamation with consistent, clear
standards for private figures to expose tortfeasors will ensure that the
marketplace of ideas functions properly.

